The Platonic Cosmology

This book is a collection of eleven essays on aspects of Plato's cosmology. Eight of the essays have previously appeared in scholarly journals. Six of the eleven are devoted to passages in the Timaeus; the others concern passages in other late Platonic dialogues. The essays are preceded by an introduction which states the main "themes and theses" developed in them; they are followed by a bibliography, an index locorum, and an index of authors cited.
The longest and most original of the essays are the first two, which deal with Tim. 30c–31b (the "unique world argument") and 37c–38c (on time), respectively. Mohr argues that the cosmos is unique because it is an "immanent standard," a sensible counterpart of the Form of Living Being (like all Forms a "transcendent standard"), and standards must be unique. In his analysis of 37c–38c Mohr also describes Platonic time as an immanent standard, namely a clock (59).
Essays three and four concern Plato's account of the Receptacle (space) and the status of the phenomena that appear in it. Space is a medium in which phenomena appear; phenomena are unknowable insofar as they are in flux, but intelligible insofar as they are images of Forms. In Essay five Mohr argues in opposition to Cornford that earth, air, fire and water, the primary bodies of the Timaeus, are present in the chaos that precedes the Demiurge's production of the cosmos and possess even then the geometric natures described at 53c ff.
Essays six to eleven deal with the relation of the cosmology of the Timaeus, Statesman, and Philebus to that of the Phaedrus and Book ten of the Laws. Mohr argues that Plato in the Timaeus and Statesman viewed phenomena themselves as causes of disorderly motion and thus as sources of evil, whereas in the Phaedrus and Laws ten all motion is caused by soul. Thus the doctrine of motion in the two pairs of dialogues is inconsistent. Mohr also claims that Plato treats the world-soul in the Statesman, Philebus, and Timaeus differently than in the Phaedrus and Laws: as a maintainer of order rather than as a source of motion. Finally, he argues that the Laws, unlike the Timaeus, must provide an explanation of evil because it does not treat phenomena as a source of evil and a limitation of the Demiurge's power as the Timaeus does.